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ABSTRACT: Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that conflict with your evaluative judgements, e.g. 
fearing flying despite judging it to be safe. Drawing on the work of  Greenspan (1988) and Helm 
(2001), Brady (2009) argues these emotions raise a challenge for a theory of  emotion: for any such 
theory to be adequate, it must be capable of  explaining the sense in which subjects that have them are 
being irrational. This paper aims to raise scepticism with this endeavour of  using the irrationality 
shrouding recalcitrant episodes to inform a theory of  emotion. I explain (i) how ‘recalcitrant emo-
tions’ pick out at least two phenomena, which come apart, and (ii) that there are different epistemic 
norms relevant to assessing whether, and if  so how, subjects undergoing recalcitrant bouts are being 
irrational. I argue these factors result in differing accounts of  the precise way these emotions make 
their bearers irrational, which in turn frustrates present efforts to adjudicate whether a given theory of  
emotion successfully meets this challenge. I end by briefly exploring two possible ways a philosophy of  
emotion might proceed in the face of  such scepticism.  
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Recalcitrant emotions, according to D’Arms and Jacobson, are emotions that exist “despite the 
agent’s making a judgment that is in tension with it” (2003: 129). For example, you fear Fido, your 
neighbour’s dog, which you judge to be harmless. The phenomenon of  emotional recalcitrance is 
said to raise a challenge for a theory of  emotion. Drawing on the work of  Greenspan (1988) and 
Helm (2001), Brady argues that this is “to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve 
rational conflict or tension” (2009: 413).  
	 Meeting this challenge is regarded as being crucial for emotion research. This is because it is 
used as a condition of  adequacy for a theory of  emotion. Brady, for instance, argues as follows: 
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For we have an intuitive sense that there is something wrong, from the standpoint of  rationality, when 
fear persists in the face of  a subject’s judgement that she is in little or no danger. In such a situation, 
we think that the subject should either stop being afraid, or should change her evaluative judgement. 
If  she does not, then it seems as though the subject is violating some normative principle governing the 
relation between emotions and evaluations. A condition of  adequacy on a theory of  emotion is that it 
should be capable of  capturing such normative principles, and thus capable of  explaining just why it 
is that emotions are irrational when they violate such principles. (Brady 2009: 414) 
The point here about norm violations is nuanced. The claim isn't that our theory of  emotion should 
be as such that recalcitrant emotions don't turn out to violate such norms. Rather, it is that recalci-
trant emotions do appear to violate them, and any theory of  emotion worth its salt should be able to 
account for the intuition that subjects undergoing recalcitrant emotions are irrational on account of  
these emotions violating such norms. This paper aims to raise some problems with this way of  un-
derstanding the nature of  emotions. 
	 In what follows, I argue these problems result from the phenomenon being under-described 
(§I), and there being different epistemic norms that are violated by recalcitrant episodes (§II). Both 
of  these factors result in differing accounts of  the precise way recalcitrant emotions make their 
bearers irrational, which in turn frustrates any effort to adjudicate whether a given theory of  emo-
tion adequately meets the challenge such emotions pose, viz. whether it can account for the way re-
calcitrant emotions make those who undergo them irrational. Note: I don’t think these problems are 
insurmountable. But they are pressing. The second problem, in particular, won’t be resolved until we 
have settled the controversy over which epistemological framework we ought to adopt towards the 
emotions more generally. The lesson, then, though modest, I think is an important one: as things 
stand, it is ill-advised to employ the intuition that subjects undergoing recalcitrant emotions are be-
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ing irrational to inform a theory of  emotion. I end by briefly exploring two possible ways a philoso-
phy of  emotion might proceed in the face of  this lesson (§III). 
I. 
Recalcitrant emotions were originally employed as a way of  objecting to judgementalism: the view 
that judgements are either constitute of, or at least necessary for, emotions.  In brief, if  having an 1
emotion requires the relevant judgement, the subject undergoing a recalcitrant emotion must be 
making contradictory judgements. For example, if  subject S can only fear an object x if  she judges 
that x is dangerous, then when S undergoes a recalcitrant bout of  fear, she simultaneously judges 
that x is dangerous and that it is not. The charge against judgementalism here is that it ends up at-
tributing a radical, and therefore implausible, form of  irrationality to subjects undergoing emotional 
recalcitrance. This in itself  isn't a knockdown argument against judgementalism. But critics, e.g. 
Greenspan (1981, 1988), argue given the choice between allowing for the existence of  emotional 
episodes that aren’t grounded in judgements, and judgemental inconsistency which results from 
denying their existence, we should opt for the former.  2
	 Whether judgementalism can adequately meet this objection is orthogonal to the concerns 
of  this paper.  But the objection helps us do two things. First, it helps introduce an all important 3
caveat. The phenomenon of  emotional recalcitrance was first introduced not as a way of  challeng-
ing theories of  emotions more generally, but to challenge a particular theory of  emotion, namely 
judgementalism. It is my view that the phenomenon is telling against judgementalism; there is a vio-
 Proponents of  the view include Solomon (1980) and Nussbaum (2001).1
 Also see Deonna and Teroni (2012: §5) and Benbaji (2013).2
 A judgementalist might be able to explain emotional recalcitrance without positing contradicting judge3 -
ments, e.g. a subject judges that flying is safe but still feels fear because what he actually fears is not flying it-
self, but the prospect of  flying. This point due to Solomon, is mentioned, though not examined, by D’Arms 
and Jacobson (pg. 129, fn.6). Also see Grzankowski (2016), who explains how judgementalists can deny attri-
butions of  radical irrationality by claiming that subjects endorse conflicting contents under different concepts 
or different modes of  presentation.
	 	 3
lation of  an epistemic norm when subjects make contradictory judgements, and it is best that a the-
ory of  emotion make do without it. My worry is with the use of  the phenomenon to inform a theory 
of  emotion more generally. In other words, the worry is with the contemporary challenge of  emo-
tional recalcitrance, where it is a requirement of  any adequate theory of  emotion that it explain the 
sense in which such emotional episodes involve rational conflict. As I hope to make clear, an expla-
nation of  rational conflict gets a lot trickier when we move away from the judgementalist scenario 
where bouts of  emotional recalcitrance, in effect, involve the subject making two contradictory 
judgements. 
	 Second, the objection helps highlight my first concern with the employment of  recalcitrant 
emotions to drive a theory of  emotion more generally, viz. the phenomenon is under-described. The 
overwhelming majority of  discussions of  emotional recalcitrance assume a pre-theoretical familiari-
ty with the phenomenon.  Moreover, expositions of  the phenomenon typically don’t extend beyond 4
the conflict definition, e.g. by D'Arms and Jacobson, and a few terse examples, e.g. “Jonas believes 
firmly that the spider is not dangerous, yet he is terribly frightened. Mary is convinced that she has 
done nothing wrong, yet she is assailed with crushing guilt” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 54). This is 
understandable given that such minimal descriptions suffice for an exposition of  Greenspan's charge 
against judgementalism. The worry is they mightn't if  we are to employ such emotional episodes, 
especially how they violate epistemic norms, to drive a theory of  emotion more generally. Ironically, 
Greenspan herself  proves to be an exception, and provides several detailed examples. The problem, 
however, is she discusses two phenomena which, though related, come apart: groundless emotions 
and emotions that conflict with our judgements.  5
	 Groundless emotions for Greenspan aren’t emotions that are groundless in any sense what-
soever, but “emotions not grounded in evaluative judgements of  their objects” (1981: 165). This is 
 E.g. D’Arms and Jacobson describe it as a “familiar psychological phenomenon” (2003: 129).4
 There are other exceptions, e.g. Rorty (1978) provides in-depth examples when discussing emotional akrasia, 5
and Dillon (1997) does likewise in her analysis of  self-respect. These examples also run-together groundless 
emotions with emotions that involve conflict.
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why she sometimes speaks of  them as emotions “radically dissociated” from our judgements. There 
is good empirical evidence to suggest that emotions can be thus dissociated. For instance, the twin-
pathway model of  emotion generation, which LeDoux (1996) confirms is implemented at the neural 
level, shows how emotions can be generated in two ways: roughly, via (1) a thalamus-to-amygdala 
circuit, which bypasses the cortex, is ‘quick and dirty’, and occurs without the conscious experience 
of  the stimulus, and (2) a thalamus-to-cortex-to-amygdala circuit, which is slow, and occurs with the 
conscious experience of  the stimulus. Groundless emotions can be accounted for given the existence 
of  circuit (1).    6
	 A clarification. The empirical data considered here might, in actual fact, support a more 
radical form of  groundless emotion, one which would prove an addition to the kinds of  phenomena 
classified as recalcitrant emotions. Groundless emotions, as Greenspan considers them, are emotions 
that aren’t grounded in evaluative judgements of  their objects. But if  the data proves correct, it 
might be that emotions can lack what Deonna and Teroni call “cognitive bases”:  7
Perception gives us direct access to the relevant objects and facts in the sense that it does not call for 
the presence of  another mental state directed at these very objects and facts, where’s emotions must 
latch on to information provided by other mental states. And these mental states, which we shall call 
cognitive bases of  emotion, can be of  radically different types” (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 5) 
The cognitive base of  an emotion, then, is whatever type of  mental state which acts as their basis. 
For example, they note that emotions directed at the past might have memories as their basis, 
whereas those directed at the present are typically based on perception, and those about the future 
can be based on imaginative expectations. Do the existence quick and dirty emotion-generating sys-
 This model of  emotion generation should give judgementalists cause for concern, but they could respond 6
that emotional responses generated via circuit (i) won’t legitimately count as emotions because they lack the 
relevant evaluative judgements which help individuate them from similar responses.
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.7
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tems actually suggest that emotions can lack cognitive bases? The answer, at least in part, will de-
pend on what we mean by perception. Circuit (1) generates emotional responses without the con-
scious experience of  the stimulus. Nevertheless, whether this entails that there is no perception of  
the stimulus is a point of  contention. Blind-sight cases suggest that we can have unconscious percep-
tions, as cortically blind subjects can respond to visual stimuli significantly well above chance despite 
reporting to not be able to consciously see the stimuli.  If  such cases are really telling of  unconscious 8
perception, then the quick and dirty path to emotion-generation needn’t entail that such emotions 
lack cognitive bases. They plausibly have unconscious perceptions as their cognitive basis.  
	 A proper investigation into the implications of  circuit (1) vis-a-vis emotions without cognitive 
bases will take us too far afield. What is directly relevant to our concerns here is that emotions gen-
erated via this circuit need not give rise to any conflict. This is precisely why Griffiths’s (1990, 1997) 
explanation for what he calls “irrational emotions” doesn’t fully account for the contemporary prob-
lem of  emotional recalcitrance, which involves conflict. Drawing on the work of  LeDoux, Griffiths 
argues that emotions can sometimes be triggered without the cognitive process of  belief-fixation that 
gives rise to judgement. For example,“If, however, only the affect-program system [roughly, circuit 
(1)] classes the stimulus as a danger, the subject will exhibit the symptoms of  fear, but will deny mak-
ing the judgements which folk theory supposes to be implicit in the emotion” (1990: 191). This ex-
plains how emotions can be radically dissociated from judgement, but it doesn’t directly speak to any 
conflict between emotion and judgement.  
	 It is my view that we can, in addition, employ the twin-pathway model to account for how 
there can be such a conflict. Roughly, such conflict arises when the thalamus-to-amygdala circuit 
generates an emotion (sans an evaluative judgement), which happens to conflict with a judgement 
the subject already holds.  For instance, a subject may hold the prior belief  that she is unafraid of  9
 See Weiskrantz (1986) for an overview. 8
 This provides a causal explanation of  the conflict, but it doesn't resolve one of  the key controversies shroud9 -
ing emotional recalcitrance, viz. the precise nature of  this conflict.
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snakes, and still have her fear responses elicited when presented with a snake. If  these responses are 
elicited via circuit (1), her response will be rapid; much too rapid for her to have a conscious experi-
ence of  the stimulus, and thereby make any judgements about what it is, let alone whether it is dan-
gerous. In this instance, we would have a groundless emotion, which also conflicts with an evaluative 
judgement. Nevertheless, the fact that emotions can be thus generated in the absence of  any pre-
held judgements that conflict with them also illustrates how emotions can be groundless without in-
volving any conflict. 
	 Similarly, emotions can involve conflict without being groundless. Of  course, if  judgemental-
ism is true, all emotional episodes, whether they involve conflict or not, will be grounded in judge-
ment. But we needn’t be judgementalists to suppose that some emotional episodes can simultaneous-
ly be grounded and involve conflict. To clarify, what makes judgementalism implausible isn't that it 
makes subjects undergoing certain bouts of  emotional recalcitrance too irrational, but that it makes 
any, and all, cases of  emotional recalcitrance cases where subjects are being too irrational. Given 
that recalcitrant emotions are assumed legion, this makes for widespread irrationality, which is im-
plausible. However, we should be careful not to rule out the possibility of  subjects ever being too ir-
rational. Your fear of  Fido, for instance, could be grounded in a (perhaps unconscious) judgement 
that Fido is dangerous, as well as being in conflict with your considered conscious judgement that 
Fido is harmless. Whether or not you think such cases are plausible, they remain possible, and are 
thereby demonstrative once again of  how the two phenomena discussed by Greenspan come apart.  
	 The fact that these phenomena come apart, as well as the fact that they overlap, is significant 
for the project of  using rationality constraints to drive a theory of  emotion. This is because it bears 
on how, including the extent to which, recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational. Having 
an emotion that is groundless is, prima facie, less irrational than having an emotion that conflicts with 
an evaluative judgement, whereas having such an emotion, in turn, is less irrational than having an 
emotion that is both groundless and in conflict with an evaluative judgement. Moreover, having an 
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emotion that is grounded and in conflict with an evaluative judgement is more irrational than all 
three instances, and is what gets judgementalists in a bind.  
	 Of  course, whether these comparisons are actually true will depend on whether, and if  so 
how, such emotions violate epistemic norms. A detailed exposition of  how emotions violate epis-
temic norms will have to wait until we have an account of  what these norms actually are, which is 
the topic of  the next section. But assuming Greenspan’s phenomena differ in the degree to which 
they make subjects irrational, this problematises the project of  using the irrationality concerning re-
calcitrant emotions to inform a theory of  emotion. This problem is best brought out by seeing ex-
actly how the challenge recalcitrant emotions pose for a theory of  emotion is presently understood.  
	 As we have seen, recalcitrant emotions have gone from being used as a way of  objecting to 
judgementalism to being independently used as a challenge for theories of  emotion more generally; 
following Brady, this is to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In 
this way, the challenge also extends to neo-judgementalist theories of  emotion.  
	 Neo-judgementalists take the judgementalist insight that some cognitive component, or 
something similarly intentional, is necessary to individuate the emotions – something traditional 
Jameseans, who take emotions to just consist in non-intentional feelings, struggle with.  But they 10
attempt to eschew the irrationality judgementalists attribute to subjects by replacing evaluative 
judgements with evaluative thoughts, feelings, perceptions, construals, and the like, which build in inten-
tional contents into emotions. Fearing Fido in such instances would involve entertaining contents 
that are, in some sense, in tension with the contents of  your judgement. You might, for instance, 
have negative feelings towards Fido, and ergo evaluative him negatively, despite judging that he is 
harmless. However, crucially, in such instances, you don’t make contradicting judgements: you don’t 
both judge that Fido is harmless and that he is harmful. Thus, though you might still be undergoing 
 Neo-judgementalists include de Sousa (1987), Helm (2001) and Roberts (2001), whereas Jamesians include 10
James (1890/1950), Lang (1922) and Prinz (2004).
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an emotion, which is in a way inappropriate, you aren't being too irrational; you aren’t contradicting 
yourself. 
	 Neo-judgementalism, then, proves to be an improvement on judgementalism, as it avoids 
judgemental inconsistency and any resultant attributions of  radical irrationality. The charge against 
such theories is the converse of  that against judgementalism: they don't factor in enough rational 
conflict to account for the irrational nature of  such emotions. This highlights the fact that the specif-
ic version of  the challenge that recalcitrant emotions raise is often treated, e.g. by Brady and Helm, 
as a dilemma:  
[E]ither we must be judgementalists and accept an overly strong conception of rational conflict be-
tween emotion and judgement, or we must be anti-judgementalists and give up hope of accounting for 
such conflict. (Helm 2001: 45) 
Judgementalism is implausible on the grounds that it imputes too much irrationality to those suffering 
from recalcitrant emotions, whilst simple versions of neojudgementalism are implausible because they 
fail to impute enough irrationality to subjects of emotional recalcitrance. (Brady 2009: 414) 
The dilemma characterises theories of  emotion as attributing too much or not enough irrationality 
to those undergoing emotional recalcitrance. For instance, on the one hand judgementalists end up 
making subjects undergoing recalcitrant emotions ‘too irrational’, as these subjects are said to make 
self-contradicting judgements. On the other hand, anti-judgementalists don’t seem to attribute any 
rational conflict at all, thus they fail to make sense of  the phenomenon, whereas neo-judgemental-
ists, though improving on anti-judgementalism, don’t attribute enough rational conflict to account 
for the phenomenon.  
	 When the challenge posed by recalcitrant emotions is understood in this way, precisely how 
recalcitrant emotions make subjects undergoing them irrational turns out to be crucial to settle the 
issue of  whether a theory of  emotion imparts too little or too much irrationality to subjects suffering 
from emotional recalcitrance. Since most of  the contemporary philosophical discussion on emotion-
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al recalcitrance adheres to D’Arms and Jacobson’s definition of  recalcitrant emotions as involving a 
conflict between emotion and judgement, we can leave non-conflict involving groundless emotions 
discussed by Greenspan aside. But even by doing so, we are still left with the two other phenomena 
she discusses: conflict-involving emotions that are groundless and those that aren’t. These, as we 
have seen, differ in the degree to which they make subjects irrational. And on account of  this, 
whether a given theory of  emotion imparts too much or too little irrationality will remain controver-
sial and dependent on how we characterise the phenomenon. The lesson, then, is that though recal-
citrant emotions are familiar, the phenomenon remains under-described, and crucially, in a way that 
proves significant for how a given theory of  emotion is supposed to meet the challenge they pose. 
	 This problem, though pressing, isn't too damning, as it is to an extent remediable. We can 
simply say more about what individual recalcitrant emotional episodes consist in, e.g. whether they 
are groundless, and determine whether a theory of  emotions accounts for the resulting irrationality 
accordingly. The problem, however, highlights two concerns with the overall project. First, because 
‘recalcitrant emotions’ pick out distinct phenomena, which differ in the extent to which they make 
subjects undergoing them irrational, we can’t speak about the irrationality of  subjects undergoing 
emotional recalcitrance tout court. Any assessment of  whether a given theory of  emotion captures the 
sense in which recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational must be assessed on a phe-
nomenon-by-phenomenon basis, i.e. whether the cases, in addition to involving conflict, are ground-
less or grounded. This isn't how assessments of  theories of  emotion, vis-a-vis recalcitrant emotions, 
currently proceed.  
	 Second, the whole endeavour of  using recalcitrant emotions to drive a theory of  emotion is 
premised on the intuition that recalcitrant emotions make their subjects irrational and the assump-
tion that any such theory should capture this intuition. Insofar as the intuition tracks different phe-
nomena, with differing degrees of  irrationality, we see that it can't be very fine-grained in terms of  
the irrationality with which it imbues subjects undergoing emotional recalcitrance. The intuition, 
that is, doesn't speak to the precise sense in which recalcitrant bouts make their subjects irrational, 
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or indeed the degree to which they do so. This makes it highly contestable whether the intuition, by 
itself, can act as a marker for whether a theory of  emotion eschews the dilemma. Both concerns, 
prescribe a revision to the current methodology of  using recalcitrant emotions to inform a theory of  
emotion. In the second instance, what we require is an articulation of  the relevant epistemic norms 
that are violated, and a detailed account of  how the two (or possibly more) phenomena tracked by 
‘recalcitrant emotions’ violates them. Only then can we have any hope of  judging the extent to 
which recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational, i.e. on account of  how they violate certain 
epistemic norms. In the next section, we see that even doing so mightn't help settle the matter. 
II. 
As we have seen, articulating a theory of  emotion, which captures the intuition that recalcitrant 
emotions make subjects undergoing them irrational because they seem to violate certain epistemic 
norms, is made difficult on account of  these emotions themselves being under-described. The 
charge against such theories is that they make subjects undergoing emotional recalcitrance either 
too irrational or not irrational enough. Nevertheless, since ‘recalcitrant emotions’ picks out phe-
nomena that come apart, and in ways relevant to how, as well as the degree to which, they make 
subjects irrational, we are not in a position to adequately adjudicate whether a given theory suc-
cumbs to this charge. 
	 Even if  this problem could be overcome, say by a more careful description of  the cases in 
question, there is, however, another way in which adjudicating the matter proves difficult; one that 
can’t be easily remedied. This concerns the normative principles which recalcitrant emotions are 
supposed to violate. The problem here is not that no such principle is violated, but that there are too 
many different principles that are plausibly violated, which in turn give differing verdicts on the irra-
tionality shrouding recalcitrant emotions. This has the consequence, once again, of  frustrating any 
effort to adjudicate whether a given theory attributes enough irrationality to subjects undergoing re-
calcitrant emotions. Nevertheless, unlike the previous problem, this is not one which can be easily 
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fixed, as it will not go away until we have settled the controversy over which epistemological frame-
work we should adopt towards the emotions more generally.  
	 Philosophers of  emotion typically don’t articulate precisely which principles are violated by 
emotional recalcitrance. Rather, what we tend to find are appeals to the intuition that they are vio-
lated — which supposedly grounds the intuition that they make their bearers irrational — followed 
by expositions of  how a given theory of  emotion accounts for this irrationality.  For instance, Brady 
notes that in undergoing a recalcitrant emotion “it seems as though the subject is violating some 
normative principle governing the relation between emotions and evaluations” (2009: 413). To be fair 
to Brady and other philosophers of  emotions, they do hint at the types of  normative principles po-
tentially violated, even though they don't specify any instances of  these types. In particular, they 
tend to speak of  epistemic (or theoretic) rationality vs. practical rationality, but without articulating 
which specific epistemic or practical norms are actually violated when a subject has a recalcitrant 
emotion.  
	 Brady himself  speaks of  “epistemic irrationality”, “which goes to the heart of  our intuition 
that they violate normative principles governing the relation between emotion and evaluations” (pg. 
428). We then find an explanation of  how recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational, and 
in a way that evades the too-irrational-or-non-irrational-enough charge. In brief, Brady assumes 
having an emotion inclines one to assent to an evaluative construal of  the relevant object or situa-
tion. Moreover, he argues recalcitrant emotions make a subject irrational because they incline one to 
accept a construal, which one has already determined to be false. Fearing Fido is irrational, for ex-
ample, because one is inclined to assent to the emotion’s construal of  Fido as being dangerous de-
spite having already judged this construal to be false. This is supposed to evade the dilemma because 
the subject undergoing emotional recalcitrance endures some sort of  rational conflict, but not one 
that makes her too irrational, e.g. make contradicting judgements. 
	 	 12
	 It is not my intention here to deny that Brady’s explanation provides a plausible account of  
how recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational.  The point is, such explanations are typic11 -
ally provided without any articulation of  the relevant epistemic principles, let alone a story of  how 
they are violated. The exception is Döring (2015) who provides two principles which might be 
thought to be violated when we undergo emotional recalcitrance: 
(i) The Consistency Principle: “Rationality requires of  you (whatever person you are) that you do 
not both judge that p and judge that not-p” (2015: 387). 
(ii) The Enkratic Principle: “Rationality requires of  you (whatever person you are) that, if  you be-
lieve at t that you yourself  ought to φ, then you intend at t to φ” (2015: 389).  12
The consistency principle is the epistemic normative principle which is violated if  one assumes 
judgementalism. This is demonstrated clearly by Greenspan’s objection. By contrast, the enkratic 
principle is a practical normative principle which is violated on the proviso that we also assume that 
emotions have motivational force, i.e. that they incline us to act in certain ways. As Döring explains, 
undergoing a recalcitrant emotion violates the enkratic principle because it motives us to act akrat-
ically. For example, if  you believe that you ought to hike in the alps (say because you believe it to be 
safe and you would like to do so), a recalcitrant fear of  heights will violate the enkratic principle in-
sofar as it prevents you from intending to go hiking.  
 See Tappolet (2012: §1.5) for a response. Brady (2013: 112) also offers a different, sparser, explanation of  11
the irrationality: recalcitrant bouts are irrational because nothing about the object or event constitutes ade-
quate reason for the emotion. As I read Brady, this is supposed to augment his earlier account. Very roughly, 
recalcitrant episodes are irrational because they involve searching for “reasons that bear on the accuracy of  
our emotional construals, despite the fact that we have endorsed the opposing evaluative view in judging as 
we do” (2013: 177). 
 Döring also mentions and rejects two further principles, one she ascribes to Tappolet (pg. 393) and the oth12 -
er to Helm (pg. 396).
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	 Döring herself  is interested in the question of  whether being recalcitrant makes emotions 
irrational independently of  their content. She grants that subjects who undergo emotional recalcit-
rance tend to violate the enkratic principle, but denies that this suffices to make them irrational. 
Crucially, following Broome (2013), she assumes that rationality consists not in corresponding cor-
rectly to reasons but rather in satisfying requirements of  coherence. On this assumption, it is only 
the violation of  the consistency principle which will make us irrational, but there is also no reason to 
suppose that recalcitrant emotions make us violate this principle if  we forgo judgementalism. 
Döring’s conclusion is that recalcitrant emotions don’t actually make us irrational. I will have more 
to say about this position in the next section. For now, note that this conclusion is supported by not 
entirely uncontroversial assumptions about rationality. Pace Broome, if  we allow rationality to in-
volve responsiveness to reason, for instance, recalcitrant emotions will turn out to make their bearers 
irrational. 
	 Döring’s list also isn’t exhaustive of  the ways recalcitrant emotions might make us irrational. 
Constraints on emotional rationality have been discussed independently, e.g. by de Sousa (1987). 
These constraints provide some possible, and crucially distinct, ways recalcitrant emotions make 
those who undergo them irrational. By way of  illustration, consider the following: 
(iii) Cognitive rationality: a subject is rational in undergoing an emotion if  that emotion is adequate 
to some state of  the world it purports to represent. 
(iv) Strategic rationality: a subject is rational in undergoing an emotion if  that emotion fulfils its 
function. 
(v) Axiological rationality: a subject is rational in undergoing an emotion if  that emotion fits some 
paradigm scenario. 
This list isn't supposed to be exhaustive either, but is illustrative of  some differing constraints on ra-
tionality concerning emotion. It also has implications for how emotions can be irrational. For any 
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given constrain we take to be relevant, we can suppose that having an emotion is irrational when 
doing so violates that constraint. Consider the following such breaches in rationality.  
	 In terms of (iii), provided all emotions concern an evaluation of  an object or situation to 
which they respond, having a recalcitrant emotion can make a subject irrational in that the evalua-
tion it makes misrepresents the world. For example, fearing Fido makes one irrational because this 
misrepresents Fido as dangerous when he clearly isn’t. We find a view akin to this in Tappolet’s 
(2012) discussion of  emotional recalcitrance. Emotions are said to have correctness conditions, e.g. 
we assess our emotions on the basis of  how they fit the world — a feature which she takes to be in-
dicative of  the representational nature of  emotion. “We criticise our fears when they are about 
things the are not fearsome, for instance. This practice suggest that the object of  fear is represented 
as fearsome” (Tappolet 2012: 210). A similar point is made by Brady (2013) himself: 
[I]t is irrational to be ashamed of  things that one does not judge to be shameful, or to feel guilt 
when one believes that one has done nothing wrong. And it is irrational to be ashamed or guilty in 
these circumstances because nothing about the object or event constitutes a good enough reason for 
shame or guilt” (Brady 2013: 112). 
Like (iii), the above rationality constraint involves a mind-to-world direction of  fit. That is, the emo-
tion, particularly the evaluation it makes, aims to fit the world. What the quote nicely brings out is 
that, contra (iii), we needn’t make any presuppositions about representation to make this point. The 
emotion can be said to not fit the world because the object or event that elicits the emotional re-
sponse doesn't provide sufficient reason for this response.  In either case, the emotion can be 13
thought ill-fitting, and thus their subjects irrational. 
	 Quite independent of  this, according to (iv), an emotion can make its bearer irrational if  it 
inhibits its function. What this function exactly is, of  course, will be controversial. For de Sousa, the 
 This account of  emotions involving justificatory reasons is discussed in more detail in Brady (2007).13
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function of  emotion, broadly speaking, is to guide us in reasoning. But more specifically, the biologi-
cal function of  emotion is to do something reason can’t, viz. to determine the salience of  features of  
perception and reasoning. It is this idea is which is expressed by evolutionary psychologists Ketelaar 
and Todd (2001) when they claim that “specific emotions might help to solve the problem of  what 
information to attend to in specific environmental circumstances” (pg. 194).  
	 To elaborate, in any given instance, there is an infinite amount of  information we could pay 
attention to, and we cannot ipso facto determine, simply by reasoning, which are actually worthy of  
consideration. Emotions streamline this process by making certain features salient, and thereby wor-
thy of  our consideration.  On this account, having an emotion is irrational when doing so inhibits 14
this function, say by making us pay attention to features of  the environment that aren't significant. 
For instance, the function of  fear is to draw attention to features of  our environment that may prove 
dangerous. The recalcitrant bout of  fearing Fido thereby makes a subject irrational because she 
ends up paying too much attention to Fido, who is already known to be harmless.  15
	 Independent of  these considerations, with regards to (v), an emotion can also be thought to 
make their bearer irrational if  it doesn't fit any relevant paradigm scenarios. Paradigm scenarios are 
“the historic origins of  an individual’s experience of  and capacity for the emotions involved” (de 
Sousa 1987: 50). These are a product of  both our biology and culture, and consist of  the following 
two aspects:  
[F]irst, a paradigm situation providing the characteristic objects of  the emotion (where objects can be 
of  various sorts, sometimes more suitably labelled "target," or "occasion") and second, a set of  char-
acteristic or "normal" responses to the situation. (de Sousa 1987: 55) 
 Damasio’s (1994) Somatic-Marker Hypothesis proposes a similar thesis. Very roughly, somatic states, i.e. 14
feelings about the body that are associated with past experiences, assist deliberation by highlighting some op-
tions as either favourable or unfavourable.
 Another form of  strategic irrationality is due to Döring, who explains the intuition that recalcitrant emo15 -
tions make us irrational on grounds that they interfere with “the reasoned pursuit of  our goals” (2014: 128). 
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The difference between cognitive and axiological rationality is that an emotion is rational according 
to the former if  it fits the world (or some feature of  the world it purports to represent), whereas it is 
rational according to the latter if  it fits some paradigm scenario, roughly a stereotypical situation 
that acts as a guide for the kinds of  situations which are appropriate for emotional responses of  this 
type. With regards to the axiological framework, then, an emotion can be said to make one irra-
tional if  it occurs in a way that doesn't fit the relevant paradigm scenario. This can happen when 
the emotional response is a reaction to an object that isn’t characteristic of  objects that elicit emo-
tional responses of  this type, e.g. fearing a harmless docile dog such as Fido, as opposed to some vi-
cious canine exposing its teeth and barking aggressively. It can also happen when an emotional re-
sponse exceeds the normal set of  responses to a situation. Feeling slightly alarmed, even fearful, at 
being surprised by a dog that walks into a room would (presumably) constitute a normal response, 
but feeling abject fear, and remaining to do so wouldn’t. Such a response would, hence, make one 
irrational. 
	 From de Sousa’s list of  ways emotions can be thought to make their bearers irrational, only 
(iii) has a bearing on the irrationality shrouding recalcitrant emotions directly in terms of  a conflict 
between emotion and evaluative judgement. (In brief, both the emotion and the judgement purport 
to represent the world, but they come to have conflicting representational contents). But all three 
might speak to the intuition that recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational because they 
violate certain epistemic norms. For instance, as we saw with the axiological rationality constraint, 
we can say that fearing Fido is irrational because it doesn’t fit any relevant paradigm scenarios. 
Likewise, via the strategic rationality constraint, we can say that fearing Fido is irrational because 
this doesn’t fit the biological function of  fear. It is prima facie plausible that a violation of  either of  
these constraints can help explain the sense in which fearing Fido is thought irrational.  If  this is 
right, crucially, it means that there needn't be any rational conflict between emotion and judgement 
to account for the said intuition. We can explain it by other means. 
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	 Now given that only the cognitive rationality constraint speaks to how recalcitrant emotions 
result in a rational conflict, mightn’t it be that only this constraint really accounts for our intuitions 
about the irrationality concerning recalcitrant emotions?  This, I take it, is plausible. However, in16 -
tuitions aren’t the sorts of  things which are very fine-grained. Since a violation of  the other con-
straints, including Döring’s normative principles, also account for how recalcitrant emotions are ir-
rational, there is no guarantee that our intuitions about the irrationality of  recalcitrant emotions, 
including our intuitions about the degree to which they are irrational, aren’t influenced by a viola-
tion of  these constraints. It therefore remains plausible also that all five constraints are relevant 
when it comes to accounting for our intuitions. 
	 An added complication concerns the perspective from which we are supposed to assign at-
tributions of  irrationality. Attributions of  irrationality that concern breaches in (i)-(v), for instance, 
are made from a subject-independent perspective, but attributions of  irrationality might also be 
made from the subject’s perspective. This needs some exposition. The conflict manifest in recalci-
trant emotions concerns not a tension between the evaluative component of  an emotion and the 
way the world is. Rather, it concerns a tension between the evaluative component of  an emotion 
and the way the subject takes the world to be, i.e. her evaluative judgement. This lets us attribute 
some level of  irrationality to the subject, for her representation of  the world contains two conflicting 
representational contents. Moreover, we can make such attributions from a subject-independent per-
spective. That is, we can describe the subject as being irrational whether she thinks she is or not.  
	 Nevertheless, some explanations of  the irrationality concerning recalcitrant emotions centre 
not on the irrationality we may attribute to the subject, but on the irrationality which the subject 
attributes to herself. In providing an explanation that very much resembles the above explanation of  
breaches in the principle of  rationality concerning (iv), Brady argues that mobilisation of  our fight-
or-flight responses when we have already judged something to be harmless is “at least from S’s per-
spective, a waste of  her limited motivational resources: it is akin to S’s preparing for a race that she 
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.16
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sees no need to run” (2009: 427). The same is true of  the mobilisation of  her cognitive resources, 
e.g. attending to the stimuli the subject judges to be harmless: “From S’s perspective, such focussed 
attention and increased sensitivity is a pointless waste of  limited cognitive resources” (2009: 427). 
	 This opens up even more possibilities with regards to the ways in which recalcitrant emo-
tions can make those who undergo them irrational, and for there to be conflict in such attributions. 
For example, if  a subject falsely judges a lion he sees on safari to be tamed and thereby harmless, his 
fear response towards the lion won’t be irrational in terms of  say (iv). His response is fulfilling its bio-
logical function as it should. Yet, the subject might still take himself  to be irrational, as he feels fear 
despite judgements to the contrary. This once again problematises any effort to judge whether a giv-
en theory of  emotion attributes enough irrationality to the subject undergoing this bout of  recalci-
trant fear.  
	 The situation, of  course, is made worse by the fact that all five of  the aforementioned ways 
emotions can be thought to make their bearers irrational can also be thought to make them irra-
tional from the subject's perspective. Thus, there are at least ten distinct conflicting ways recalcitrant 
emotions can be thought to concern irrationality: the actual violations in constraints (i)-(v), and the 
supposed violations of  these constraints from the subject’s perspective. The upshot of  this is that, as 
in section §I, whether a given theory of  emotion attributes enough irrationality to subjects undergo-
ing emotional recalcitrance will be controversial. But there are two differences. First, in this instance, 
the controversy results not because of  the way we characterise the phenomenon, but because of  the 
epistemic principles that may be violated. Second, this controversy is not easily remedied because 
which principles are actually relevant for the rationality of  emotions more generally is presently con-
troversial. Which of  the constraints (i)-(v) are actually relevant for emotional rationality? All of  
them? Some of  them? None of  them? The philosophy of  emotions is nowhere near to answering 
these questions. Nevertheless, until we settle this issue of  which epistemological framework we ought 
to adopt with regards to the emotions more generally, we cannot settle the controversy over how ir-
rational having recalcitrant emotions really are. All of  this suggests that the present practice of  using 
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the intuition that recalcitrant emotions are irrational to inform a theory of  emotion is, and will likely 
remain, deeply problematic. 
III. 
To recap, recalcitrant emotions are said to raise a challenge for a theory of  emotion, viz. to explain 
the precise sense in which subjects undergoing these emotional episodes are being irrational. This 
paper aimed to raise scepticism with the endeavour of  using this challenge to drive a theory of  emo-
tion. The arguments provided did not require us to deny the intuition that acts as the basis for this 
challenge: the intuition that subjects possessing recalcitrant emotions are being irrational, as these 
emotions seem to violate certain epistemic norms. Instead, it was demonstrated that the irrationality 
shrouding recalcitrant emotions — whether they make their bearers irrational, how they do so, and 
the degree of  irrationality concerned — is extremely controversial.  
	 The controversy results from two factors. First, the phenomenon of  emotional recalcitrance 
is under-described, and it is not clear whether all instances emotional recalcitrance track the same 
phenomenon. Second, they are too many distinct epistemic norms that may be violated by these 
phenomena, ones which give differing, and often conflicting, verdicts on the irrationality of  those 
who undergo them. Crucially, the second factor, as we saw, isn't easily remedied. This matters be-
cause it means adjudicating whether a given theory of  emotion meets the challenge can’t be settled 
in an unproblematic way, as the precise nature of  the challenge in itself  is, and will likely remain, 
controversial.  
	 There are two ways a philosophy of  emotion might proceed in the face of  such scepticism. 
The first is to resist it. Though the content of  this paper has been overwhelming negative, it also 
sheds some light in how we might overcome such scepticism. As evident, we need to be a lot clearer 
about both the phenomenon of  interest and the epistemic norms that are (supposedly) violated 
when this phenomenon occurs. In terms of  the former, not all irrational emotions need be recalcit-
rant. Moreover, even ones that are, as we saw, can differ in the ways they affect how, as well as the 
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degree to which, they make their bearers irrational. One option is to double-down on a more specif-
ic definition of  emotional recalcitrance. A better option is to provide an exposition of  the varying 
phenomena caught under the broader umbrella of  ‘emotional recalcitrance’, and make  our assess-
ments of  irrationality by taking these differences into consideration. For example, in Greenspan’s 
(1981) original example, the subject fears all dogs, including Fido, because they’ve been traumatised 
on account of  being bitten by a rabid dog previously. In this case, the subject presumably has some 
form of  post-traumatic stress disorder, which is quite reasonable, or at least far more reasonable 
than simply fearing a dog they judge to be harmless. Therefore, it helps to make a distinction 
between recalcitrant emotions which are groundless and those that aren’t, and make assessments 
about their irrationality accordingly.  
	 The problem of  filling in the specificities of  the recalcitrant cases we choose to consider 
doesn’t seem insurmountable. What proves more difficult is agreeing on a set of  norms by which to 
judge whether the recalcitrant cases we consider actually involve any norm violations. As we have 
seen, the difficulty is owing to an abundance of  distinct epistemic norms which might violated when 
we undergo emotional recalcitrance. This difficulty is compounded by two factors. First, which epi-
stemic norms apply to recalcitrant emotions will (partly) depend on which norms apply to emotions 
more generally. Second, which epistemic norms apply to emotions more generally will, in turn, 
(partly) depend on which epistemic norms govern human rationality. The worry, then, is that until 
we have settled these issues, we cannot make any real progress in determining whether, and if  so 
how, recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational. 
	 I don’t think we should down play these worries. Nevertheless, there is still room to make 
some progress. Not all norms concerning human rationality will bear on emotion. Moreover, even 
ones that do might not be specific to emotional recalcitrance. Subsequently, if  we are to explain 
what’s so irrational about recalcitrant emotions in particular, we could begin by looking at norm vi-
olations that are specific to emotional recalcitrance. The consistency principle is a good candidate. 
If  judgementalism is true, by having a recalcitrant emotion you violate this principle, i.e. you both 
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judge that p and not-p. Moreover, this isn’t a norm which is violated when you undergo other kinds 
of  irrational emotions, e.g. where you have a groundless emotion that doesn’t involve any conflict 
between emotion and judgement.  
	 The problem with the consistency principle, of  course, is that it isn’t violated unless we as-
sume judgementalism. So if  we are to insist that recalcitrant emotions involve a rational conflict 
between emotion and judgement, and that a theory of  emotion should explain this, we also need an 
epistemic norm that is plausibly violated even if  we forgo judgementalism. Something along these 
lines is suggested Brady himself. According to Brady, “it seems plausible to suppose that someone 
suffering from recalcitrant emotions is subject to a certain rational requirement, namely to ensure 
that her emotions and her evaluative beliefs line-up” (2007: 276). Brady doesn’t think this suffices to 
explain how recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational. But it does motivate a different kind 
of  consistency principle, one which is also violated when we undergo emotional recalcitrance:  
(vi) Consistency principle*: rationality requires of  you (whatever person you are) that whenever you 
have an emotion that conflicts with a judgement, you out to either revise your emotion or your 
judgement. 
I think this is a step in the right direction. Unlike the consistency principle considered earlier, this 
principle has the benefit of  being the kind of  principle which is violated whether or not one assumes 
judgementalism. However, I also think the applicability of  this principle is hostage to two factors, 
both of  which are controversial. 
	 First, there must be some reason why rationality should require of  us that we either revise 
our emotions or our judgements when we undergo emotional recalcitrance, as not all conflicting 
mental states seem to require such revision. For example, rationality doesn’t seem to require of  you 
that you change your perception or judgement when they are in conflict. Here Döring provides an 
answer. Emotions have motivational force; they incline us to act in certain ways, even ones that con-
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flict with our goals. Subsequently, there is good reason to try to change our emotions when they in-
terfere with the reasoned pursuit of  our goals. For example, if  being unjustifiably jealous makes you 
behave in a way that threatens your relationship, there is good grounds for you to try to stop being 
so jealous. There are other reasons too. Some, but by no means all, recalcitrant emotions, make 
their bearers suffer. Feeling immensely jealous can be agonising, ergo a subject who agonises in this 
way has good cause to alter their emotional state — ie. whether or not this also influences their be-
haviour. 
	 Second, emotions should also be the kinds of  things that can undergo revision. Following 
Tappolet (2012, 2017), I’m assuming here an ‘ought implies can’ principle. To elaborate, recalcitrant 
emotions often involve a conflict between an emotion and a considered evaluative judgement. If  
emotions aren’t malleable, applying the consistency principle* means that we should always revise 
our judgements, even our considered ones. This proves problematic as it brings us in tension with 
other considerations of  rationality. It would be odd, for instance, to insist that you should change 
your judgement when you undergo a recalcitrant bought of  jealousy, especially if  you know that 
your partner loves you and is highly unlikely to stray. By contrast, following Tappolet, emotions, I 
take it, exhibit some form of  plasticity. In particular, we can influence our emotional dispositions 
over time.  So while we cannot revise a bout of  recalcitrant jealousy in that very moment, we can 17
change our dispositions for jealousy in a way that there can be some requirement of  us that we 
should, at least sometimes, revise our recalcitrant bouts of  jealousy, as opposed to our considered 
judgements.  
	 I take these considerations to be plausible but also speculative. The point here isn’t to really 
side with a particular response to the challenge of  recalcitrant emotions, let alone offer a new one, 
but to highlight how we might plausibly make progress in terms of  articulating the kinds of  con-
straints that would enable us to to employ the irrationality concerning emotional recalcitrance as a 
general benchmark for a theory of  emotion. As evident, we can make some progress in terms of  ar-
 Also see Faucher and Tappolet (2007, 2008), and Majeed (2019).17
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ticulating the constraints that apply specifically to emotional recalcitrance. Nevertheless, as also 
evident, any progress we can make will itself  be subject to other considerations, e.g. considerations 
about the nature of  emotions, as well as more general considerations about the nature of  human 
rationality. Considerations, which at present, remain controversial. 
	 All of  this can also be seen to motivate a more radical response, namely instead of  resisting 
the scepticism raised in this paper we can just embrace it. The contemporary challenge of  emotion-
al recalcitrance is understood to be one where it is a condition of  adequacy for a theory of  emotion 
that we should be able to employ it to explain the sense in which such recalcitrant emotional epis-
odes involve rational conflict.  As we have seen, not only are our current attempts to employ this 
condition problematic, but there are serious obstacles to making any progress in terms of  applying 
this condition in a problem-free manner. This provides grounds to drop the adequacy constraint. 
That is, we adopt a sort of  quietism about emotional recalcitrance, one where we no longer suppose 
that there is any general challenge posed by such emotions.  
	 An upshot of  this sort of  quietism is that versions of  neo-judgementalism, which were criti-
cised by Brady (2009) for not attributing enough irrationality to those undergoing emotional recal-
citrance, should now be put back on the table. To clarify, this needn’t entail that we put judgement-
alism itself  back on the table. We can suppose that judgementalism is problematic because of  what 
it suggests about recalcitrance cases, but we can simultaneously forgo the need to generalise, i.e. em-
ploy recalcitrant emotions as a measure of  any given theory of  emotion. If  we are to go this route, 
we need some story about why the irrationality shrouding recalcitrant emotions is relevant as a con-
dition of  adequacy for judgementalism but not for theories of  emotion more generally. The content 
of  this paper helps provide such a story.  
	 One of  the difficulties with employing recalcitrant emotions as a benchmark for a theory of  
emotion is that the normative constraints that might be violated by them are numerous, which result 
in competing accounts of  why recalcitrant emotions make their bearers irrational. These normative 
constraints are germane for judgementalism as well. However, there is a crucial difference. There is 
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one rationality constraint — arguably the most central of  all — which is violated if  one assumes 
judgementalism but that isn’t on other theories of  emotion, viz. the consistency principle. Judge-
mentalism, as we saw, entails that a subject both judges that Fido is dangerous and not dangerous 
when they undergo a recalcitrant bout of  fearing Fido. This principle isn’t violated by other theories 
of  emotion, at least not the ones presently under consideration. Embracing quietism, then, needn’t 
be a point in favour of  judgementalism.   
	 The problem with quietism is that it will require a lot more justification. To elaborate, quiet-
ism tends to be of  ill repute due to its supposed passivity in the face of  substantive philosophical 
problems. But this rests on a misunderstanding. Speaking specifically about Wittgenstein’s version of  
quietism, McDowell notes that “Wittgenstein’s quietism is not a refusal to engage in substantive 
philosophy in the face of  what everyone has to accept as genuine problems. It is an activity of  dia-
gnosing, so as to explain away, some appearances that we are confronted with genuine 
problems” (2009: 371). The scepticism raised in this paper about the contemporary challenge of  
emotional recalcitrance provides a solid foundation from which to argue for a quietist position of  
this sort. Nonetheless, I have not argued that the problems we face are irremediable. If  they can be 
overcome, quietism would prove premature.  
	 Here it would be remiss not to mention Döring’s response to the contemporary problem of  
emotional recalcitrance, which like quietism also raises scepticism about the contemporary challenge 
of  emotional recalcitrance. Though the two positions are slightly different. While the form of  quiet-
ism mentioned above is motivated by a lack of  a clear epistemic framework to ensure that our intu-
itions about the irrationality surrounding recalcitrant emotions are correct, Döring strikes a stronger 
verdict: our intuitions are wrong-headed as subjects undergoing recalcitrant emotions aren’t actually 
irrational. If  she right, her view can be used to justify our quietist position in a way that we haven’t 
been able to thus far. As we saw earlier, Döring argues for her verdict by articulating precisely the 
kinds of  normative principles which I argued are missing in most discussions of  the emotional recal-
citrance. However, as we also saw, there are more constraints on rationality that are prima facie relev-
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ant to assessing the irrationality concerning recalcitrant emotions than Döring considers. So we 
can't be sure whether her position is ultimately warranted until we take stand on these other con-
straints.  
	 As I see it, whether we adopt the first or second option will, ultimately, depend on how much 
progress we can make towards specifying the normative principles actually violated when we under-
go emotional recalcitrance. Nothing I have said in this paper suggests that this would be impossible. 
By the same token, all evidence suggests that it will require considerable work. I won’t make a guess 
as to the outcomes of  such an endeavour here. Instead, let me end by reiterating what I take to be 
the central lesson of  this paper: make of  recalcitrant emotions what you will, but as things stand, it 
is ill-advised to employ the intuition that subjects undergoing emotional recalcitrance are being irra-
tional to inform a theory of  emotion. 
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